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‘None	of	the	above’	is	no	longer	an	option	for	the
Eurozone
Covid-19	has	reignited	concerns	about	the	future	of	the	Eurozone.	Mark	Copelovitch	explains	that
there	is	no	sound	economic	reason	why	the	Eurozone	and	its	member	states	should	find	themselves
in	such	a	dire	position.	The	problem	is	entirely	political	and	can	be	solved	only	if	European	leaders
finally	step	up	and	address	the	core	problems	threatening	the	Eurozone’s	long-term	survival.
The	Covid-19	pandemic	once	again	has	left	the	Eurozone	teetering	on	the	brink	of	collapse.	After	an
initial	stumble,	the	European	Central	Bank	has	responded	aggressively.	President	Christine	Lagarde	has	fully
embraced	the	“Draghi	doctrine,”	noting	in	her	announcement	of	the	ECB’s	$750	billion	bond	purchasing	initiative,
the	Pandemic	Emergency	Purchase	Programme	(PEPP),	that	“there	are	no	limits	to	our	commitment	to	the	euro.”
The	ECB’s	aggressive	intervention	has	been	welcome	news.	But	the	crisis	also	requires	a	joint	European	fiscal
response.	This	is	why	I	joined	more	than	300	other	scholars	in	signing	an	open	letter	to	the	Financial	Times	urging
Eurozone	leaders	to	“mutualize	the	fiscal	costs	of	fighting	this	crisis”	by	issuing	common	debt.	Unfortunately,	the
“frugal	four”	countries,	led	by	the	Netherlands	and	Germany,	have	sharply	opposed	Eurobonds,	claiming
predictably	that	this	would	create	moral	hazard	and	punish	countries	that	saved	responsibly	for	rainy	days.	Instead,
the	Eurogroup	cobbled	together	yet	another	underwhelming	compromise	that	fails	to	resolve	the	Eurozone’s
enduring	problems	and	reflects	the	stubbornly	persistent	narrative	of	“northern	saints”	and	“southern	sinners,”	in
which	debt	is	equated	solely	with	deficit	countries’	“fiscal	sins”	and	never	ascribed	to	structural	problems	of
monetary	union.
But	monetary	union	is	not	a	morality	play,	and	the	Eurozone’s	core	problems	and	fundamental	imbalances	remain
the	same	as	they	did	two	decades	ago.	These	persist	because	of	two	key	policy	errors	that	have	been	left	to	fester
for	years:	the	“original	sin”	of	admitting	countries	into	the	EMU	that	clearly	failed	to	meet	the	Maastricht	criteria,	and
the	failure	to	fully	resolve	the	last	euro	crisis.	As	with	the	recent	Eurogroup	package,	politics	drove	these	decisions.
Monetary	union	simply	could	not	exclude	one	of	the	“original	six”	countries	of	the	European	Community	and	the
European	Coal	and	Steel	Community.	Likewise,	the	Eurozone’s	crisis	policies	since	2010	have	delicately	balanced
political	interests	–	most	importantly,	the	domestic	political	preferences	of	Germany	and	Angela	Merkel.
German	Chancellor,	Angela	Merkel,	speaking	with	Dutch	Prime	Minister,	Mark	Rutte,	at	a	European	Council	meeting,	Credit:
European	Union	
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Unfortunately,	“kicking	the	can	down	the	road”	has	left	these	problems	to	fester,	particularly	in	Italy	and	Greece.
This	legacy	debt	problem	is	most	clearly	visible	in	Italy.	Measured	by	its	primary	budget	surplus,	Italy	has	been	as
fiscally	prudent	as	Germany	and	the	Netherlands	since	the	establishment	of	the	euro	in	1999.	Yet	two	decades	of
austerity	and	primary	surpluses	have	not	reduced	Italy’s	debt	level,	leaving	it	saddled	with	a	decades-old	overhang
and	lacking	fiscal	space	to	address	the	Covid-19	crisis.	In	Greece,	the	economic	devastation	remains	truly
staggering.	The	country	is	now	mired	in	a	depression	longer	and	deeper	than	the	Great	one,	with	GDP	stuck	more
than	20%	below	2007	levels	and	a	full	recovery	still	years,	if	not	decades,	away.
These	festering	problems	have	now	transformed	another	serious	shock	into	an	existential	crisis,	again	raising	the
spectre	of	the	Eurozone’s	collapse	and	the	EU’s	uncertain	future.	Economically,	this	makes	no	sense.	The	ECB
issues	the	world’s	number	two	reserve	currency	and	inflation	is	negligible.	Most	of	the	Euro-19	can	borrow	at
negative	real	interest	rates	in	essentially	unlimited	quantities.	The	Eurogroup,	as	a	whole,	faces	no	real	resource
constraint,	and	there	is	no	sound	economic	reason	why	it	should	find	itself	in	such	dire	straits.
The	problem,	of	course,	is	politics,	most	notably	sharp	cross-national	disputes	about	the	distributional	costs	of
adjustment	policies.	But	what	is	politically	expedient	today	for	surplus	countries	like	Germany	and	the	Netherlands
is	almost	certainly	unsustainable	in	the	long	run	for	deficit	countries	like	Italy	and	Greece.	As	French	President
Emmanuel	Macron	noted	in	his	interview	with	the	Financial	Times	earlier	this	month,	the	Eurozone	faces	a	“moment
of	truth”	requiring	both	greater	North-South	“solidarity”	and	major	reform	if	it	is	to	survive.
What	might	a	sustainable	Eurozone	look	like?	There	are	at	least	three	options.	The	first	involves	deeper	fiscal
union,	with	some	form	of	shared	debt.	The	second	involves	little	or	no	fiscal	integration,	leaving	crisis	policy
primarily	to	individual	governments.	But	in	order	for	all	states	to	have	the	fiscal	“breathing	space”	to	deal	with	crises
unilaterally,	this	option	requires	comprehensive	debt	relief	to	finally	eliminate	the	debt	overhangs	and	permanent
austerity	plaguing	southern	countries.	The	third	version	involves	neither	fiscal	union	nor	debt	relief	but	requires
periodic	large	fiscal	transfers	from	surplus	to	deficit	countries	during	crises,	along	with	the	gradual	“monetisation”	of
debt	through	an	ECB	that	targets	and	delivers	higher	inflation.
Eurozone	leaders	have	categorically	ruled	out	the	first	and	second	options	for	a	decade,	on	the	grounds	that	they
are	politically	infeasible,	while	pretending	that	they	have	chosen	option	three.	In	reality,	they	have	not:	the	fiscal
transfers	have	been	far	too	small,	and	the	ECB	has	undershot	its	inflation	target	for	nearly	a	decade,	making	it	all
but	impossible	for	Greece	and	Italy	to	adjust	through	internal	devaluation	and	austerity	alone.	In	reality,	Eurozone
leaders	have	repeatedly	chosen	“none	of	the	above,”	opting	only	for	half-measures	that	prevent	the	euro’s	collapse
but	fix	none	of	its	fundamental	problems.	This	“failing	forward”	has	severely	weakened	political	support	for	the
Eurozone	(and	the	EU)	in	the	south.
In	short,	a	sustainable	Eurozone	requires	Germany,	the	Netherlands,	and	others	to	decide	if	they	were	truly	serious
when	they	signed	up	for	a	monetary	union.	If	so,	they	must	finally	choose	some	combination	of	economically
feasible	but	politically	unpopular	policies:	deeper	fiscal	union,	comprehensive	debt	relief,	larger	and	permanent
north-south	transfers,	or	permanently	higher	inflation.	This	involves	wrestling	with	difficult	tradeoffs	and	being
honest	with	voters	about	the	Eurozone’s	real	problems,	rather	than	falling	back	again	on	unhelpful,	moralising
narratives.
However,	choosing	“none	of	the	above”	is	unsustainable.	The	status	quo	–	with	its	half-hearted	fiscal	solidarity	and
permanent	austerity	for	southern	countries	–	will	eventually	lead	to	the	Eurozone’s	demise.	The	euro	has	survived
for	two	decades	by	kicking	the	can	down	the	road.	Yet	as	Herb	Stein	famously	noted,	“If	something	cannot	go	on
forever,	it	will	stop.”	European	leaders	should	seize	the	momentum	provided	by	the	pandemic	crisis	to	finally,	at
long	last,	address	the	core	problems	threatening	the	Eurozone’s	long-term	survival.
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the
London	School	of	Economics.
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